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BOOK REVIEWS

The Mighty and the Almighty, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Cambridge, UK, and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 181 pages. $81.00 hardcover.
LUKE MARING, Northern Arizona University
In The Mighty and the Almighty, Nicholas Wolterstorff aims to: (i) disprove
the view, common in political theology, that disobedience to the state
necessarily constitutes disrespect to God; (ii) sketch a novel, yet recognizably Pauline, account of the limits of state authority; and (iii) undermine
perfectionist accounts of the state, again common in political theology, by
showing that a Pauline account of government resonates with contemporary liberalism.
Let us begin with (i). Why would disobedience to the state constitute
disrespect to God? The argument traces back to the apostle Paul, who famously wrote that God gave authority to all governments. This seems to
imply that by disobeying the state, one rejects God’s appointee—saying,
in effect, that God was wrong to put her in charge.
Wolterstorff argues that traditional political theologies—including,
notably, John Calvin’s—are guilty of a conceptual confusion. Positional
authority, for Wolterstorff, amounts to holding office in an institution that
is widely regarded as authoritative—by dint of her membership in the
police force, an officer has positional authority. Performance authority, by
contrast, is the authorization to do some particular thing—to write speeding tickets, for example. Now, legislators in a government have positional
authority; but it does not follow that they have the performance authority
to write immoral laws.
Turn to (ii): Wolterstorff denies that governments have the performance
authority to write immoral laws. What is his positive account? What, exactly, does God authorize governments to do? According to Wolterstorff,
Paul thinks that governments are primarily in the business of curbing
wrongdoing. To develop Paul’s view, Wolterstorff borrows Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper’s concept of spheres. Different human enterprises
inhabit different spheres or sectors—science, art, religion, and family, and
so on. Within each sphere, different authority structures hold sway. In
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the sphere of science, universities are an authoritative structure; within
religion, churches are in charge; and so on. These spheres should, according to Wolterstorff, exist alongside one another without encroaching into
each other’s domain. So it is presumably wrong for the Christian church
to insist that creationism be taught alongside evolution in science classes,
just as it is wrong for non-religious groups to force Sikhs and Muslims to
abandon religious apparel. Unfortunately, institutions routinely overstep
their boundaries. Enter the state: states are to curb wrongdoing by punishing institutions that try to commandeer neighboring spheres. The state’s
second main task is similar: to curb, via punishment, the wrongdoing of
individuals.
We can now see why Wolterstorff denies that citizens must choose between disobeying the state and disrespecting God. A government that institutes immoral laws oversteps its performance authority. God authorizes
the state to curb wrongdoing, not to become the agent of wrongdoing itself.
One semantic quibble: Current political philosophy distinguishes between authority and legitimacy. Authority is the normative power to give
someone a moral reason to ϕ by writing a law that tells her to ϕ; legitimacy
is the permission to use one’s authority and to enforce laws. Possessing
a normative power is one thing; the permission to use and enforce it is
something else. Thus, the activity of curbing wrongdoing—Wolterstorff’s
performance authority—falls under the heading of legitimacy. The upshot
of this semantic quibble is that it isn’t altogether clear which side of the
contemporary debate Wolterstorff is on. Whereas statists believe that we
are bound to obey the law because governments are authoritative, philosophical anarchists hold that if we have moral reasons to obey the law, it is
because the law tells us to do what we already had authority-independent
moral reasons to do (e.g., the state commands us not to murder). If the state
is merely authorized to curb wrongdoing, and not also authorized to write
laws that make actions count as wrongdoing in the first place, Wolterstorff
is not a statist.1
Now turn to (iii). Political theologies are typically perfectionist, holding that the state’s job is to make citizens and society morally excellent—a
task that goes far beyond the protection of basic rights. It is not hard to see
why political theologies have a perfectionist bent: they are committed to
a (fairly) comprehensive account of the good, and they see governments
as one of God’s tools for realizing it. Wolterstorff goes against the grain,
and argues that his Pauline view of the state resonates with contemporary
liberal democracy.
At first glance, this may seem implausible: the job of a liberal democracy is to protect a relatively small number of basic rights, whereas
1
Many thanks to Terence Cuneo for pointing out to me that Wolterstorff commits to statism; see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012). However, I still find it odd that a book dedicated, in part, to outlining the government’s proper role doesn’t come down on either side of the statist/philosophical anarchist
debate.
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Wolterstorff’s Pauline view assigns government the task of curbing wrongdoing in general. We do wrong when jealousy makes us miserly with our
praise; but liberalism’s list of basic rights does not traditionally include a
right to be praised. Or again, we do wrong when cruelty leads us to mock
our peers; liberalism objects only if our jests manage to deprive people of
their basic rights. Yet Wolterstorff’s argument proceeds:
To wrong someone is to deprive her of something to which she has a right,
a legitimate claim. And to deprive her of something to which she has a right
or legitimate claim is to treat her unjustly. So instead of saying that it is
the God-assigned task of government to curb wrongdoing, we could say
that it is the God-assigned task of government to curb injustice. . . . [In other
words,] God has assigned government the task of being a rights-protecting
institution.2

Since the raison d’être of liberal democracy is to protect rights, Wolterstorff
concludes, “we get an argument for a state that is limited in exactly the
sort of way that our liberal democracies are limited.”3
Now, in the first sentence Wolterstorff claims that every instance of
wrongdoing violates a right. He defends this claim at length in a different
book.4 But whether or not his defense succeeds, it’s certainly not true that
every wrongdoing violates one of the basic rights that liberalism traditionally protects. In assigning governments the task of curbing wrongdoing
in general, Wolterstorff’s Pauline view threatens to authorize far too much
state intervention to qualify as liberal.
Wolterstorff does emphasize, on several occasions, that the state should
not curb wrongdoing if the moral cost of doing so would be worse than
the original wrongdoing. This is a sound principle, which may be traced
back to at least John Stuart Mill. Can we use it to close the gap between
Wolterstorff’s view and liberalism? Perhaps, but doing so wouldn’t show
that there is any natural affinity between the two. On the assumption that
governments do more harm than good by trying to curb wrongdoing that
is unrelated to basic rights, even the most overtly perfectionist view, when
combined with Mill’s principle, will result in a liberal government. Mill’s
principle can liberalize any political philosophy. So the fact that Wolterstorff plus Mill equals liberalism is no reason to think that Wolterstorff’s
view is particularly liberal.5
2
Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Mighty and the Almighty (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 90.
3
Ibid., 150.
4
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2008). More thanks are due to Terence Cuneo for pointing this out to me, and for helpful comments on a draft of this review.
5
That might not be a bad thing. Feminists, critical race theorists, and critical gender theorists have all pointed out that our history of discrimination has concentrated wealth, power,
and privilege disproportionately in the hands of whites and of men. With its emphasis on
basic (and mostly negative) rights—they continue—liberalism ends up preserving an unjust status quo. The public-private distinction, to take just one example, has meant that the
government does not protect women’s rights where they are often most imperiled: at home.
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I will close with a meta-concern.6 The pluralistic, many-spheres structure of Wolterstorff’s account implies that the Bible is not authoritative in
politics; yet Wolterstorff develops his political philosophy by consulting
the writings of the apostle Paul. The problem here is not that religious
resources are inadmissible in politics. Wolterstorff describes the state as
the “sphere of spheres,” as a sphere that encompasses all the others.7 So
religious resources are admissible because resources from all human enterprises are admissible. We should design our government using the best
of the business world, the best from religion, and so on. The problem is
rather that anyone—Christian or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s
view must also believe that principles from the Bible are not privileged
in the sphere of spheres. We can consult the Bible, but only in the way
that we would consult canonical economic texts, A Theory of Justice, Das
Capital, journals of social science, or anything else. So no one—Christian
or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s political philosophy should
believe it simply because it is the best interpretation of Paul. Wolterstorff
therefore has to defend his view on its merits, which is a task The Mighty
and the Almighty leaves undone. I mean this as a call for more work, not as
knockdown criticism—there is no a priori reason why views inspired by
the Bible cannot be defended on their merits.™
The Mighty and the Almighty is a worthwhile read. Wolterstorff’s Pauline
account of the state is interesting in its own right—not least because it explains why institutions, as well as individuals, can be right-holders. This
is a significant departure from the individualism of most western political philosophy, and it is a plausible one. Interesting philosophical projects
raise new questions as they solve old problems; we should look forward
to reading Wolterstorff’s answers.
Because he thinks the state is supposed to curb wrongdoing in general, Wolterstorff’s political theology may, depending upon which rights he emphasizes, support a view that is more
progressive than liberalism.
6
I am indebted, here, to a conversation with Russ Pryba.
7
Ibid., 166.

The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, by Stewart Goetz. London and
New York: Continuum, 2012. 189 pages. $24.00 paper.
JOSHUA SEACHRIS, University of Notre Dame
In The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, Stewart Goetz contributes to
the expanding discussion within analytic philosophy on life’s meaning.
Regrettably, for the better part of the last century analytic philosophers
pp. 232–236
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